Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy’s Editor-in-Chief intervew with Elbridge Colby, Trump’s pick for under secretary for policy. December 30, 2024.
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/foreign-policy-live/id1034003458?i=1000682146791
“Hi, I’m Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy’s Editor-in-Chief. This is FP Live. Hey, I hope you enjoyed our last episode looking back at 2024 with Farid Zakaria, the CNN host and global affairs commentator.
Our next episode is going to be with Farid again, looking ahead to 2025. In the meantime, I thought I’d bring you an older episode that has become newly relevant. Back in July, we spoke with Elbridge Colby, who served in the last Trump administration and helped write its national security strategy.
As we said at the time, Colby is influential in Trump’s orbit and was expected to get a key role in a potential Trump 2.0 administration. Well, Trump won, and as predicted, Colby just got named to an important new role. He’s going to be under Secretary of Defense for Policy, basically the top policy person at the Pentagon.”
“It’s a very influential role. When I spoke with Colby on FP Live, he made the case that Biden’s view of alliances as sacred was a quote absurdity. And when pundits and commentators reflexively criticized Trump’s transactional nature, well, Colby says, transactionality adds some much-needed balance to American policymaking.
In light of his new role, I thought it would be worth re-examining everything else he said as well. So here goes. I should point out the role Colby was nominated for requires Senate confirmation, so this isn’t a done deal.
But most of us expect it to go through. This is our final episode of 2024. Back next week with Morfrey Zakaria and our look ahead at 2025.
I hope you’re enjoying your holidays. Let’s dive in.
Rich Colby, welcome to FP Live. Great to be with you, Ravi. So let’s just begin by getting one disclosure out of the way.
You want to make clear that you do not speak for the Trump campaign.
Yes, thank you very much. I appreciate that. Yeah, I don’t speak for President Trump or the Trump fans campaign.”
“I make no presumptions about any particular role I might have in the future. So I would be honored to serve if they asked in a role where I could have an impact, but I don’t make any predictions and people shouldn’t understand me as saying so.
Thanks. Got it. I was going to follow up by asking if you would join a Trump administration where you offered a job, you are often touted as a potential national security advisor, maybe deputy NSA, but it looks like your answer to that is yes.
Yes, I’d certainly be honored to serve. I think I’d want to do something where I could have a good impact. That would be the only thing.
Yeah, that makes sense. Let’s dive right into the idea that you are most credited for, and that is the argument that there is a trade-off between aiding Ukraine and deterring China. You said quite clearly that Asia is more important than Europe when it comes to US national security.
Why?”
“Well, I mean, I think I approached this as I laid out in my book and elsewhere from the standpoint of a colloquial realism, a pragmatic realism focused on American’s practical interests. If you look at traditional American foreign policy, it was basically designed certainly since the Second World War to prevent a potentially hostile state from dominating the most important kind of market area, the basis for a great power to use that strength to undermine our way of life. If you look at it that way, there’s really no question that Asia is the most important area.
That was not true 75 years ago. Sometimes people say that I’m a descendant of the Asia firsters of the early Cold War, but actually I would have been a Europe first person at that time or in World War II because Europe was more important economically. Look, don’t take it from me.”
“Kurt Campbell gave a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations about a month ago, in which he argued against the prioritizer point of view. It was ironic to see the father of the pivot arguing against the pivot. But he himself pointed out that Asia is well over 50 percent of GDP.
I think it’s about half of global population, and it’s where growth is concentrated. There’s an argument that trade between the United States and Europe offsets this. But at best, that’s a minor key argument.
There’s really no question that Asia is more important than Europe, and then you get to the issue of trade-offs which do exist.
I just want to point out the pivot to Asia argument was first outlined in foreign policy more than a decade ago. Bridge, I just want to leave China and Taiwan aside for a minute because I just want to focus on the European aspect of the point you just made, and if the White House makes clear to European leaders that it is less important, doesn’t that hurt America’s most important alliances? Don’t alliances matter?”
“Alliances absolutely do matter, but this is the thing, Ravi. I actually fundamentally disagree. For instance, there was a thing in CBC.
I deal with the Canadian media a lot, and they were sort of complaining about the idea that we might actually press them to spend more on defense and meet their defense commitments. My view is alliances are so important that we actually expect people to do their part, because yes, China is dangerous. Yes, Russia is dangerous.
Yes, North Korea and Iran are dangerous. And yes, we need military power, and we do not have an adequate degree of military power given China’s rise and so forth. And so we need allies to do their part.
And so we should act accordingly. And to me, I think stepping back, the implicit understanding, if I may be forgiven, behind what you’re saying is that alliances are sort of feel-good operations. They’re sort of, the way that Biden describes them is kind of sacred.”
“I don’t think that’s how we should look at alliances. I think we should look at them as, frankly, more in a somewhat business-like way, that they’re supposed to serve both sides’ interests. Obviously, they have very deep connections.
They should be honored. But at the end of the day, these alliances are meant to do something for us and for others. If people are not doing that, which has been the case, for instance, in Germany, in Japan, Taiwan, then there really needs to be consequences for that.
Otherwise, we’re actually not taking alliances seriously. I do take alliances seriously. The whole context of Trump-proofing NATO, if Trump-proofing NATO leads the European countries in Canada to actually spend more and meet their defense commitments, that’s actually the thing they should be doing anyway, so that’s good for them.
Yeah. But just to push you a little bit, I mean, to use your business analogy, I mean, let’s say a CEO in America has a deal with the CEO in Europe, and the American CEO says, you know what, I’m just going to pull out of this deal. Words matter, and it sends a signal.”
“And for example, the signal that Moscow might get from a White House that says Asia is more important, the signal could be that it can adapt its policy in Europe to be more aggressive, that it can have its way. And I think that’s the critique of what you’ve been saying here, is that words and signals matter in diplomacy.
Well, sure, but actions matter more. And at the end of the day, we need to reconcile actions with reality. And the words, implicit behind what you’re saying, I use words too.
I use words advisedly to get people’s attention and to get them to key to reality and take things seriously. For many, many years, American, very high officials of both political parties were politely ignored by the Europeans and others when they made, you know, plaintively or sort of nicely made arguments to the Europeans and others. And so somebody has to get their attention.”
“And in my view, is if we’re not communicating a costly signal that this is very serious and there are real dangers, that’s actually not being good allies. I actually don’t think Biden, who’s released the pressure on European allies in a lot of ways, has done them any favors. And by the way, let’s look at the record.
I mean, the largest attack, the largest war in Europe happened under President Biden’s watch. So you want to talk about words and actions. I mean, and the beginning of the uptick in spending happened under President Trump’s presidency.
So yes, you’re right that there are risks to being frank. But I think what’s been clear to me is there’s no costless or riskless course of action. And the people who say we need to be polite and so forth are smothering the reality and not doing our friends and allies any favors.”
“I believe that it’s much better, especially in democracies like our own and that of most of our allies, that we have to be clear and generate the political urgency and will for action. And that’s generally how things have moved in the last few years. We would have been better off though if we’d adapted earlier.
You know, Bridge, I just want to point out, this is going to be one point of tension in this conversation. You clearly use words advisedly and we’re speaking to you as an independent thinker and policy maker. But, you know, as we attempt to decode what a Trump foreign policy could look like in 2025 and beyond, I’m afraid he does not use words as advisedly as you do.”
“I’m allowed to say that you may not be able to sort of agree with me there. But when he does say that he, you know, is threatening to pull out of NATO, I’m afraid European leaders take that very seriously, and they’re often struggling to make sense of what to make of it. I want to take a subscriber question as we often do, and this one’s from Sam Denny at the Carnegie Endowment.
And he points out that America often tries to get Europe to go along with sanctions on China or tougher policies on China. And if the next White House does what you are prescribing, which is to treat Asia as more important than Europe, then wouldn’t European countries question whether they should reduce their economic exposure to China? In other words, wouldn’t Europe feel less inclined to go along with American policy making on China?”
“Yes, although, well, I haven’t written this in Foreign Policy, so forgive me, but I have already anticipated that point. And my fundamental view and the way that I think my strategy most significantly differs from that of the Biden administration is in the salience of military power, not because I’m some fetishist of the military, but rather I’m convinced even more after the Ukraine war, although I laid this out in my book, which came out before that, that what really matters in deterring and if necessary, defeating aggression against ourselves or our allies is military power in the right place and the right time. And I’m increasingly unimpressed with sanctions as a tool.
And I think they’re, I would say, pathetically, you know, pathetic performance in the case of Russia. We can only sort of expand on that on its limits, if you will, or emphasize its limits even more in the case of China. And so my view on European sanctions towards China is that they would not matter even if they were imposed.”
“Our own sanctions would not drive China off Taiwan or if they move beyond that to the Philippines one day or something like that. It’s military power that matters. And I think it’s very unlikely the Europeans would impose them anyway.
Because I think the visit of Chancellor Schultz to Beijing recently, last year’s visit by President Macron, that is a more sort of significant indicator of real. And I actually understand where the Europeans are coming from. Their economies have taken a massive hit because of the war in Ukraine, etc.
Maybe some bad decisions on things like North Stream 2 and green energy. But the point is the way my proposed Europe policy would differ is that we would focus the Europeans on taking care of themselves. So I had a kind of exchange with Foreign Minister Sikorski a couple of months ago publicly where he said, well, maybe we’ll trade with China.”
“I said, that’s fine. If you guys are taking a much greater degree of care of your own security, that’s what we want. The other thing, and I think there’s a deeper point in here, Ravi, which is I don’t believe that the Europeans are going to suddenly defect to the Russians.
My whole policy is based on a kind of realistic appraisal and appreciation of country’s own interests and capacity. You’re not going to get the Dutch to care as much about Taiwan as they do about the Baltics or Ukraine. Okay, act accordingly.
It’s a relatively small country. The Poles are not going to defect to Moscow. There is give in our relationship.
If you go back historically, there’s a lot of a historical commentary, especially by people who want to wrap themselves in the flag of World War II and the Cold War. We pushed our allies very hard, very, very hard. If you go back to President Eisenhower, if you go back to the balance of payments crisis under LBJ, the Mansfield Amendment, this actually used to be a Democrat thing.”
“There’s a lot of room just like in a serious business partnership, and the Europeans can do this and they know that. That’s the thing, Ravi. Let me last point, is they are already moving, which shows that my strategy is actually viable.
They are appreciating the point.
But two things can be true at the same time. America can ask Europe to do a lot more, and it seems like it is, and that’s happening. But two, America can continue to support Europe in the way that it is, and maybe more, because what if, with the policy you’re describing and suggesting and proposing, what if Ukraine falls?
And then what happens?
Well, look, my own view is that we should remain in NATO and the European pillar should take lead responsibility. And if you look at an excellent paper by Camille Grand, who just left NATO in the European CFR, they get it, the direction of travel, they understand. I’m a voice, but they see the overall trajectory is towards a greater focus on Asia and China.”
“And so far our conversation has been focusing on Europe, which is a symptom of the problem that we face in the foreign policy debate, which is Europe is a fraction of Asia and Russia’s a tenth the size of China. Why are we spending all this time dealing with Europe? Of course, I don’t want to abandon Europe, but I’m dealing with the reality of the situation that we face.
And I mean, I know we’re going to get a little bit more into issues of military spending, but there simply are constraints. I mean, China is the largest state we have dealt with. It’s the first time that we are not by far the largest state in the international system for about 150 years.
So that just by necessity imposes constraint. My view is, my strategy is the one that will save NATO. The people who are seeing hosannas to NATO and refuse to depart from the shibboleths, those are the people who are going to put NATO right into the iceberg and sink it because it’s going to stretch it too far.”
“That’s the approach that I take and I think actually we’re seeing it happen.
One last question on this particular thread on Europe and also the topic of signals. What signal does all of this send to Xi Jinping? Because there’s an argument that goes that Beijing is watching America’s role in Europe and it’s taking lessons from global support for Ukraine.
If America steps back in its support for Ukraine, it will read that as a signal that America may also one day step back from its support for Taiwan in a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Aren’t you concerned about the signal that less support for Europe sends to Xi Jinping?
I think it’s a factor, but I would say it’s like a tertiary factor. Again, this gets it to theoretical issues. I think a lot of the discussion has a kind of, I would say it’s liberal internationalist frame, but frankly, it’s almost like a pedagogical idea about how international relations works, that Xi Jinping is going to learn a lesson as if he’s sitting in class and waiting to be instructed about the behavior of the United States.”
“Side note that this was a similar argument that the United States made in Vietnam relative to Europe, which turned out not to be the case. I think much more significant for Xi Jinping, rationally, and I don’t know what’s in his mind, is the military balance in Asia and our perceived resolve for potential contest with China in Asia. That of course is interrelated because the more resources we have available, the less costly it will be, and so the demands on a resolve will be lower.
I think their behavior maps much more closely onto what I would expect. I think this tends to be a rationalization or tendentious. Why is that?
Because if the Chinese actually believe that the future of Taiwan and the Western Pacific was going to be resolved in Ukraine, they would intervene directly because nobody cares more about Taiwan than they do. At minimum, they would provide large-scale lethal support to the Russians, which they’re not doing. Instead, what they’re doing is they’re bleeding us out and they’re letting the war go on.”
“They’re not even giving the Russians enough for a decisive victory. Then at the same time, they’re building up their forces relative to the first island chain. I think unfortunately, they’re acting as I would advise, which is I think much more practical and much more dangerous.
They’re clearly listening to this. Underpinning a lot of what we’re talking about here, I think is American military might. You’ve long said that the United States doesn’t have a military that can fight two wars.
Well, a new bipartisan review of US defense strategy ordered by Congress says that the Pentagon should go back to resourcing and planning to fight wars in multiple parts of the world. Do you think they’re wrong?
Well, here’s the most important part of that study. Like here’s the part that everybody should center on. They agree, in fact, their analysis of the American military may even be harsher than my own.”
“They say we’re not prepared to fight even China. Their current assessment, as I understand, and I haven’t had time to review it in detail, but their current assessment is that readiness is at historic lows that the United States is not equipped to fight China, let alone multiple major wars, that our defense industrial base is in terrible shape. So that’s their empirical assessment today.
Their prescription is for the United States to dramatically increase defense spending to resource a multi-theater military. Now, what my basic response to the commission report is, I do not believe it’s a viable basis for a defense strategy going forward. Why?
If our military is in such bad shape, how can we be in a position where we can be leaning forward or expansive or aggressive in three theaters? A number of these commissioners are people who’ve called for a military action against Iran, for no-fly zones in Ukraine, which of course would risk a war with Russia very realistically, and for aggressive policies towards China and North Korea. How is that possible?”
“To me, the basic criterion of a strategy, the core of a strategy is coherence, that you have to match the resources that are available with the strategy you’re proposing. I think that this commission report, as far as I can tell, does not do that. Anybody who comes into office in November or in January of next year, and I hope it’s President Trump, but even if it’s Vice President Harris, you can’t run the playbook they’re talking about.
The very fact that they are calling for such a radical change indicates that if anything, they should be calling for even more laser-focused than I am. In fact, one of your reporters quoted my point to your observation that we don’t have a multi-war military. They agree with that.”
“In fact, they’re saying we don’t even have a one major war military because we’re behind the curve on China. One of my great frustrations in the defense and geopolitical debate is that the same people who’ve been saying for 15, 20 years we’ve been underspending on defense, and that we need to double defense spending and cut Social Security and Medicare and all that. These are the same people who are saying we quote unquote, can’t afford not to be a global power.
Well, how does that even make sense? It’s incoherent because if it were true what they were saying, then if anything, they should be far more dovish than I am. The only other thing, if you’ll permit me, Robert, to say is looking forward, correct me if I’m wrong, but I see no discussion in the national political debate.
Again, I don’t speak for anybody else. I see no discussion of dramatic increases in defense spending. I know the Republican platform, which President Trump had a personal involvement, it says we should have a strong military used sparingly.”
“It’s not talking about doubling the defense budget. I’m pretty confident Vice President Harris is not talking about that. Both sides are for protecting Social Security and Medicare.
In fact, the single most important element in President Biden’s departure may have been the comment about Medicare. Then of course, we have Jay Powell saying, 100 percent debt to GDP is a problem. Today, I think the New York Times reporting, we’re looking at something, I think it was like $35 billion debt.
So that leads me to say the political support in this country first. I believe that we will need to spend more, but I think we’re going to have to be pretty realistic, and we’re going to have to focus just to keep up with the Chinese. And probably the people are going to make the best, most credible argument for increases in defense spending.
Are the kind of people, say, who are against the Iraq War or who have not been for using up our military in the Middle East over the last 20 years? And I don’t see that happening right now.”
“So I take your point on that and sort of, again, underpinning this discussion at least is your idea that the United States should focus more on Asia than Europe because its military is constrained. But there’s a missing element to this. And I want to bring in a question by another one of our subscribers, Tim Reed, who wants to ask you about the Middle East.
And given that you often talk about limited resources, America gives more aid to Israel than any other country, should it?
Well, I don’t think that’s true. I think we’ve given more aid to Ukraine over the last couple of years than we’ve given to Israel.
I meant than any other country does to Israel, is what I meant.”
“Oh, okay. Well, yeah, I mean, I support a strong relationship with Israel, but my position has been that we should make sure that we don’t give to Israel capabilities or resources that are relevant for the first island chain. And my view with the Israelis is they’re actually not really asking us to directly intervene in the Middle East.
And we have a basis with something like the Abraham Accords to take a more recessed approach. I wrote something in the Israeli press about a year ago, basically saying, look, we’re going to have to take a step back. But the deal should be continued support, which I support, and then less of a bear hug.
Like right now, I feel like Jake Sullivan said back last fall, the Middle East is more stable than ever, kind of trying to extricate. And now we’re more involved than ever. And we’re talking about giving the KSA, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a formal security guarantee.”
“There’s an argument we already have an informal security guarantee. My view would be, look, I think stepping back, and I think this is a critical point, Ravi. There’s two parts to my argument.
The second part, which I’m confident in, but is arguable, is that we should focus on Asia, because that’s where our interests are most significant and imperiled. The first part of the argument that I honestly think is not arguable, and it should be a ticket to entry into a serious discussion, is that we face a world of scarcity and thus hard choices. So my proposed strategy is not necessarily going to be music to the ears of various parties, although my sense is the Israelis are fairly realistic about the situation.
But any strategy that does not involve some kind of hard choices or reckoning with scarcity, I just think should be kind of put out of serious consideration, because it’s not dealing with the reality we face.”
“Just one point on that, since you pointed out that Israel needs different kinds of defense support than Ukraine does. John Aquilino, who is the Indo-Pacific commander, has said that the US military actually is equipped to support both Taiwan and Ukraine simultaneously, and that’s in part because their needs and priorities are fairly different. So wouldn’t that argument apply as well if you’re using it for the Middle East?
Well, that’s not exactly what I said. There are possibly trade-offs, and my view is we should withhold key assets for the first island chain even in the case of Israel. Obviously, there are areas where they’re not trade-offs.”
“I don’t think that’s what Aquilino actually said, and I candidly have significant concerns with Admiral Aquilino’s public statements, which as I understand it, were quite different than his private statements, and that gets to the point of I think Admiral Aquilino missed an historic opportunity to message the public about the gravity of the situation, because in our system, you need to be able to tell the story publicly. I think what Aquilino actually said was something to the effect that resources from the Indo-Pacific have not been drawn out of the Indo-Pacific to Europe. But clearly, for instance, Indo-Paycom itself had an unfunded priorities list, I believe, of $10 or $11 billion.
Almost $200 billion have been sent to Ukraine, right? Obviously, the Taiwanese and others in Asia are behind the Ukrainians and Europe in terms of prioritization. And it’s just not true.”
“In fact, I actually know, I believe, has advocated for having a two-war force, which is not really the job of the Paycom commander. But leaving that aside, we don’t have that force. And look, I mean, government officials and serving military officers have, for instance, I know General Brown said something very confident about how the United States will perform in a Taiwan scenario.
There may be good reason for that, but I would point to the RAND Corporation’s assessment by like David Ochmanek, who’s written and we’ve written together for Foreign Policy, that the United States is on track to lose the war over Taiwan. Serving government officials have an incentive and maybe even a duty to put a good face on things, although my personal view is more realism would be in order. But I would put a discount on those comments from Aquilino.”
“So we’ve been scurrying around China. Let’s talk about it more directly now. In Strategy of Denial, one of your points is that Washington needs to deny China the opportunity to attack Taiwan.
Is it your contention that this White House isn’t doing a good enough job on that front?
I don’t think that’s really up for question. I think there’s phenomenal things happening, like that Assistant Secretary of Defense Eli Radner is doing on posture, and others, of course, are involved. There’s progress, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall, I’ve lauded his work in urgency.
But there’s some, actually, Admiral Papparo, Aquilino’s replacement said something in Ed Wong piece in the New York Times about a month ago, where he talked about basically just in the naval buildup, yeah, we’re maybe doing okay, but we’re doing a lot less well than the Chinese are. Somebody said, hey, Bridge, you got to get more credit, we’re putting points on the board. I said, well, they’re putting a lot more points on the board.”
“To quote Top Gun, there’s no points for second place. That’s the problem. There’s all kinds of sort of triple bank shot logic arguments about, oh, the capabilities needed in Ukraine are different than the ones needed in the first silent chain.
That’s not true. We know air defense is very relevant. And we know that the PLA, we have to assume that they would get ashore.
So a lot of the capabilities would be very similar. Moreover, the defense industrial base is stretched, subcomponents are in demand. And of course, money.
And back to my point about constraints. I mean, Speaker Johnson went to the Hudson Institute and gave a very stirring set of remarks about the quote unquote absence of evil. I don’t like that term.”
“But he didn’t call for increasing the defense budget. And he said that the number one threat facing the American people is the debt. So $200 billion is a lot of money that could have gone to our first island chain defense.
And of course, the Taiwanese themselves are woefully inadequate to the threat they’re facing. I mean, 1.4 billion people. The Journal was reporting, I think, last week that they may be ahead of us in supercomputing.
Who knows, but they’re definitely competing. Huawei has survived and is actually now doing pretty well, according to the Journal. And the Taiwanese are spending 2.4 percent of GDP on defense.
I mean, that’s wildly inadequate.
Let me ask you this. Is there a danger to thinking that war with China is preordained? And doesn’t that risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy?”
“Absolutely. I challenge you to find a case of me saying that war will happen. And if I have, I’m happy to correct.
I’ve tried to be super scrupulous that we don’t know what’s going to happen and that war is not inevitable. However, what we do know is that the Chinese, in fact, Frank Kendall has said this, we do know that the Chinese are preparing for a war, not only militarily in terms of conventional forces and exercises, but also nuclear forces, but also economically, preparing for large scale sanctions, stockpiling the Delete A campaign and politically conditioning the population. So I think the only prudent assessment is to assume that they could go to war and that our best chance to avoid a war is deterrence plus something else we don’t get to.
Also, if it does happen, we want to be in the best position possible. But actually, I don’t think it’s inevitable. If you look at my Twitter and other things, you’ll see that I very consciously try to message the Chinese that I’m not pursuing, or I propose pursuing moderate goals.”
“I gave a speech at the National Conservatism Conference where I emphasize this. Basically, openness to a modus vivendi. And I think this is what President Trump, and again, I don’t speak for him, but when he says he’s open to talking to Xi Jinping, this is good.
I mean, we know that Xi Jinping is saying that we are strangling them. That’s what he told Biden last fall. And again, if I can critique these sort of hawks, what really drives me kind of, I think is sort of the worst policy is to not recognize the constrained situation we’re in, hand tons of money and weapons to Europe and the Middle East, and then go and support an independent Taiwan, or call Xi Jinping Hitler, or call the Communist Party and the government of China evil.”
“Like whatever you think privately, people who are representing the United States, in my view, should adopt a much more prudent approach that says, for instance, my friends Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher have said, let’s pursue regime change and primacy. Now, they calibrated their regime change point, but that was certainly a key part in your rival publication, Foreign Affairs. My view is we should seek a balance of power, and we should deal with the Chinese government as it is.
That’s why I advisedly use the word Beijing as much as possible, because China is a country full of people, and if anything, I have a tremendous respect for them and their history and accomplishments. The Chinese Communist Party, I’m an anti-communist, I hate communism, but what I’m really thinking about is the behavior of China as a state, which to me is Beijing is probably the least bad way. But we should be open to coming to a modus vivendi, which is speak softly and carry a big stick.”
“But we’re not really doing that. The current administration is emphasizing that as limited aims, but it doesn’t have the stick. Some of its Republican critics talk a big game and wouldn’t realistically resource the stick.
Then the government in Taiwan isn’t resourcing the stick and is actually poking the Chinese in the eye politically, if anything, in things like Lai Qing does in inaugural speech. I don’t say that from a perspective of abstract moral judgment. But if you’re facing country of 1.4 billion people, that doesn’t even deny the willingness to use military force and is exercising to do it, maybe you want to make sure you’re in a stronger position before you start talking a lot.”
“Over the last few years, a lot of foreign policy observers have made the argument that the Trump administration right-sized China policy by seeing Beijing a bit more as a threat. Of course, since then the threat has only gotten worse in a sense. But when you speak to countries in Asia, most of whom count China as their biggest trading partner, many of them actually yearn for an earlier era of US policy, which enabled China to grow and lift 800 million people out of poverty.
The idea underpinning that other era of US policy from Kennedy to Clinton was that a rising tide lifts all boats. That consistent policy and the backstopping of a rules-based system, it benefited both small and big countries alike. Do you think we’ve now moved away from that era to a more transactional sense of how America approaches China?”
“Well, where we are is one question. I think in my book, I try to lay this out conceptually, that it’s important in my view to listen and, going back to a point I made earlier, to work with what the market will bear in various countries. And I think you’re right, that most countries, like say, in ASEAN, many of them would prefer to go back to the old days.
But my view is that the old days are gone, China is now so strong and we can’t let it keep going as it was. So I think this conferencing more, recognizing the necessity of a confrontational policy, because China had been pursuing that sort of policy, was a critical and historic shift under President Trump. There were people like me, then there were people like Pottinger and others who were more probably ideologically driven about it.
My view is, I think the policy that I’m laying out is one that can resonate with those concerns. It doesn’t ask, it’s not a John Foster Dulles approach. It’s not saying, hey, Laos or Myanmar or Malaysia, you got to pick sides, with us or against us.”
“Rather, and I go through this in my book, it’s saying which countries have the plausible desire and capability to directly stand up. I think we know those countries, obviously, Japan, Taiwan itself, Philippines, Australia, India. Then South Korea will work with it and so forth.
Then what I think the message that I would recommend giving is we’re going to be tough, but we’re also going to be open to a modus venti. This isn’t the bamboo curtain era. I think that differentiates my approach from many of the more hawkish voices, the more ideologically driven voices that are talking about regime change or these things.
I think it’s viable. I see a lot of similarities between the kind of policy I’m talking about and that external affairs minister, Jaishankar, in India is talking about. Just the kind of hard-nosed, realistic, interest-oriented, Martian results, understanding that these problems are never going to fully go away and that that’s part of the dynamic.”
“Well, let me ask you a question I often put to the Indian foreign minister then, where does human rights fit into this? Where does soft power fit into this? I recently conducted an interview with Singapore’s defense minister at the Aspen Security Forum.
We aired it on FP Live as well. He raised a point that really made me think. He asked me and the audience there, whether we thought that the United States can sustain its presence in Asia solely predicated on military power.
In other words, does soft power not matter? What about the interests of all these other countries in Asia that are quite uncomfortable with America’s China policy? Even keeping in mind that yours is less ideological, more nuanced, even there, there are fears that it comes across as too transactional.”
“Well, let me step back because I think implicitly in what you’re saying is a moral critique and I reject the moral critique and here’s why. I wrote an article in First Things about two years ago, people are interested, it’s called The Morality of Strategy of Denial. Why?
It’s a sort of Morgenthau style argument, which is I’m not a pure consequentialist, but I think foreign policy, in a sense, like again, business should be or stewardship or trusteeship, should be judged on the reasonable anticipation of results. The best thing for democracy, frankly, certainly the best thing for the American people, for others is peace and a situation in which there’s a decent peace and the ability to trade in some ways without a large war. I think the opposite point of view that you’re pointing to is a kind of, and with Tony Blinken maybe as the purest expression these days, or Samantha Power, would be a foreign policy of intentionality.”
“Are we expressing ourselves? I actually think the results are worse and they can be anticipated to be so. Thus, that’s really what should be measured, which is in a model of stewardship or of trusteeship, if you will, which is what our foreign policy should be.
I think moralism is inferior to the morality of a realistic foreign policy, not a mock politic, aggressive conquering foreign policy, but a realistic one. You skipped over an important part that I think I surmised the Singaporean Defense Minister was pointing to, which is economics, which is not really soft power. I would say the bulk of American engagement in Asia should be economic and then very focused and capable military power.
I think of military power in this context as being like the police, which is if you don’t have enough of it, it’s all you care about. But once you get to a decent place, it should recede into the background. But I think economic engagement and my general impression, certainly dealing with the Singaporeans, but others in Asia, it’s obviously generalization, so an imperfect assessment, but is that economics is what really speaks.”
“In terms of soft power, I’m very skeptical of soft power as a driver of foreign policy outcomes, kind of primary driver, I think it can help. But I think, again, I think one way I think about it is I’m a real sort of realist. I think American foreign policy has always been a sort of unstable mix of realism and liberalism, if you will, or idealism, whatever you want to call it.
But I think liberalism and idealism has gone way up in the balance since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we need to recalibrate. Of course, Americans are always going to be expressing, and we should, we should what we think is right. But as a matter of government policy, I think we should bring the realism part back, frankly, to closer to where it was in the Cold War for most, certainly under Republican presidents, and even JFK and Truman, I would say, which is, you know, look, this is about, it’s a tough world out there.”
“You need to take care of interests. And of course you stand for what you believe in, but the most important thing for the future of democracy is not letting Asia be dominated by China, right? So it’s sort of over determined.
So since we’re riffing on realism as much as we are, I have to bring this up. FP columnist Stephen Walt, who teaches at Harvard University and is known as one of the world’s leading realist scholars, recently wrote an essay for us in which he points out that the realists who have embraced the Trump-Vance ticket are basically being short-sighted. And his point is that the Trump-Vance world view overestimates how the United States can do whatever it wants on the world stage, but it also underestimates how rising middle powers, so countries like India and Brazil and Turkey, are simply less inclined to care about a unilateral American foreign policy.
I know you don’t speak for Trump or Vance, but how would you respond to that?”
“A couple of thoughts with all due respect for Professor Wald. I mean, first of all, I don’t think, as I understand, I haven’t read the piece, but I don’t think President Trump and Vice President, excuse me, Senator Vance are at all talking about sort of unipolar or unilateral approach. I think as I’ve laid out, there’s an argument to be made.
We would see, of course, what would happen, but President Trump, his approach is essentially saying we’re not going to be able to do everything. We expect others to step up. I’ll put it this way more broadly.
I think realists have come to dominate the academy, but they’ve had almost no traction in foreign policy here in the imperial capital. That’s a big problem because politics is reality, and it’s okay to be, in fact, you need to be political. It doesn’t mean you subordinate your principles.”
“I certainly try not to. Others can judge, but that’s certainly my view. But you have to politically engage.
My view is we’re in an exceptionally dangerous period, and the idea of realists of all people sitting in the ivory tower and casting thunderbolts is facially absurd. Realists should understand that it’s important to get in there, and you’ve got to deal with the world as it is. I am very happy to support President Trump and Senator Vance.
Even if you don’t, realists for years and years have been talking about the need to get NATO to recalibrate and to do more and to potentially reduce our forces in the Middle East. Well, President Trump was the first major candidate really, certainly on the Republican side, who was really calling for that. Ironically, President Obama had made some similar noises.”
“I don’t think he was very successful at it. But that’s one of the reasons I tend to look to an older generation of realists. I mentioned Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin, who taught at Princeton.
None of these guys is perfect, but I think realism is more of an ethos. No one has a command on, there’s no hope of realism. So I think that’s my approach on that.
Yeah. But there’s an interesting left and right as well. I feel like you have been trying to define a new conservative realism of late.
I’m curious how you contrast that with what I’m hearing from modern progressive thinkers. I’m thinking here of Ben Judah in the UK, who writes for FP quite often. But David Lammy, who he advises, Lammy is the new British Foreign Secretary, who’s argued for a progressive realism that strikes me as not that different from what you’re calling for, but if I may say so, a bit more rooted in humility and an understanding that the world around us has changed.
Is that right?”
“Yeah. I mean, the last part, I might differ, but I’m prepared to posit it. But yes, and I think one of the things that I’ve been trying to signal is, my view is that our foreign policy should be driven by realism and outcomes.
That means that we the Americans should be prepared to engage with countries that don’t have the same ideological orientation as President Trump and Senator Vance might say. If I were a Brit, I would probably vote on the right somewhere. But we have a government now with David Lammy and Defense Secretary Healy and Ben.
That is, as I’ve said, what we want are partners and allies who are self-reliant, pragmatic, hard-nosed, whether left or right. I think there is a lot of overlap with a number of progressive realists. I mean, Stephen Wardheim would be another, Emma Ashford, who writes for you.”
“We’re going to disagree on various issues and that’s totally fine. But to me, again, a realist is saying, how can I work with people even if I don’t entirely agree with them? And that’s why a lot of my critiques are actually people who are ostensibly, at least on a similar part of the political spectrum.
But their fundamental orientation is quite different from mine. So clearly, we’re in a time of great political and geopolitical change, as you emphasize. And so my view is, let’s work with people where we can.
Why is it so hard to define a Trump doctrine? So Robert O’Brien, who was Trump’s National Security Advisor, his fourth, I believe, may well take up such a role again if he wins, wrote recently that Trump adheres not to dogma, but to his own instincts. And one way of looking at that bridge is that it’s nimble, but it’s also unpredictable and unreliable.”
“It’s transactional. And if you are purely transactional, then you’re basically stepping away from the international system that, all things considered, has actually served the world order pretty well for eight decades. No?
Well, a couple of thoughts. First of all, I would say we don’t want to be completely transactional, but more transaction, again, getting back to that balance. I think we’ve gone to the point where it’s, you know, again, Biden talking about alliances as sacred is an absurdity.
Nothing is sacred in American politics. So we need to be a bit more transactional. People need to do their part.
And so it’s sort of grubby. But if you take alliances seriously, they need to do that. A thought about the doctrine.”
“I mean, I think most of these doctrines are artificial. And most presidents, I mean, there’s a Reagan doctrine and a Truman doctrine. But they tended to be a Nixon doctrine.
They tended to be ex post facto, or they talked about a narrow thing. Did the Carter doctrine on the Middle East really define his whole foreign policy? I don’t think that’s probably that accurate.
But I think there’s a general theme that I can ascertain in President Trump’s approach, which is, I thought it was not a coincidence and it was compelling, that the central term in the Republican platform was common sense. That there’s sort of a, and that’s obviously common sense is all thanks to all men. But there’s a, I think, is sort of a practicality.
Is this in our interests? Does this still make sense? I mean, I remember getting up and cheering when Trump said in 2016 that the Iraq war was a mistake.”
“It was like this blinding flash of common sense. And it otherwise, you know, as if you’re living in a parallel universe in the Republican Party. So I think that’s sort of how I would look at that sort of element.
We’re almost out of time. Last question. January 6th, 2021 is forever gonna loom over Trump, I think.
A failure to peacefully transition power was a serious injury to American standing in the world. Trump also recently told a group of Christian voters that November’s election will be the last time that they need to vote. I know you don’t speak for Trump, but purely as a foreign policy analyst, if Trump is reelected, will the United States ever be able to talk about the importance of democracy in a foreign policy context again?”
“Well, look, I condemned the violence on January 6th. I did at the time, but I think President Trump has been democratically elected by the primary voters and if he’s elected, by definition, he will be democratically elected. There’s a lot of disagreements in this country.
I don’t think they should become violent, but I also don’t think we should get into the situation where we’re banning people or casting people beyond the pale. My view again is, look, the purpose of American foreign policy is ultimately in an enlightened way looking to collaborate with others, is to serve the American people’s interests, and that does provoke a lot of people to heeded opposition to President Trump. But I think he’s absolutely right about that.
Yeah. Again, very diplomatic answer, and I take your point, but to what I was saying earlier in this conversation, words matter. And so when a candidate for the presidency says that he may not say that an election was free and fair, if he doesn’t win, it matters.”
“It sends a signal to the rest of the world.
Well, look, I mean, we have to see how the election goes, right? I mean, I think we should accept the elections as they’re processed and so forth, and I have. But I mean, it’s also within the rights of American people to question things and to look into what’s actually going on.
And I think there are a lot of concerns among a lot of Republicans and independents, and probably Democrats too, about how things. And so a free and open debate is important. That’s not to be taken for granted.
And there’s a lot of activities by the other side that raise real questions as well. So, I mean, there was polling recently that asked Americans who would be a better steward of democracy, at least, or was in some of the swing states, I can’t remember. And President Biden, excuse me, President Trump came out ahead of President Biden.”
“So that tells you where, you know, the American people see things that may be not where Davos or Aspen or Munich see things. But that’s where the American people think. And to me, that’s democracy.
And that’s why we have an election. Bridge Colby, thank you for joining us.
Thank you.
And that was Elbridge Colby, the man nominated by President-elect Trump to serve as the top policy person at the Pentagon.”
